Let's start with the geographical reach of IMEEC.
The IMEEC, consisting of two separate corridors - the eastern corridor and the northern corridor - would span two continents. The former would connect India to the Middle East, where the UAE would act as an Indian Ocean connectivity node for India. The latter would connect Gulf countries to Europe through the Israeli port of Haifa and the Greek port of Piraeus. The maritime leg of IMEEC would, thus, start from the Indian ports of Mumbai and Mundra (Gujarat), and end in the UAE. Then, a railway network, connecting the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel, would be built. Finally, Haifa would, then, be connected through a maritime route to Piraeus, Greece, to eventually be connected to Italy, France and Germany through railway links. Though the United States is not a direct beneficiary of this mega maritime and land-based project, it has another agenda to fulfil that we will be discussing in this piece.
The IMEEC would involve constructing multimodal rail channels and shipping routes over 5000km, capacity enhancement of seaports, electricity cables, hydrogen pipelines and high- speed data cables. Though the financial costs of IMEEC are yet to be announced, media reports speculate costs varying from $8 billion to $20 billion (Atlantic Council). This project is an extension of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), a collaborative infrastructure-building project backed by G7 countries. It is worth noting here that PGII was earlier launched under the name Build Back Better World (B3W) and it is widely seen as a counterweight to President Xi Jinping's signature BRI project. In terms of infrastructure and connectivity, the IMFEC is a significant project to create an arch of commercial and communication connectivity across the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Though still in the planning stage, the project could stimulate economic development through enhanced connectivity and economic integration between Asia, the Arabian Gulf and Europe. Notwithstanding the geopolitical and geoeconomic significance of the IMEEC, it is the first communication and transport project that includes as diverse countries as India, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the European Union; all these have different and multifaceted motivations. These distinct motivations deserve our attention to better understand the larger picture of geopolitics and geoeconomics working against the backdrop of this ambitious project.
India, prima facie, could emerge as a major beneficiary of this project as it would have opportunities to enhance economic efficiency, reduce transpor tation costs and significantly boost throughput via transit routes, But India has other axes to grind. One of them is its Western dilemma, which is hindering its ambitions to reach European shores through a reliable and cost-effective route. Pakistan, situated at the western border with India, has long objected to allowing transiting Indian goods to Afghanistan and eventually to Central Asia and Russia due to legitimate security concerns and the antagonistic nature of bilateral relations. Under normal conditions, India would prefer using Gwadar port for offloading its goods and then transshipping them to Central Asia and Russia through Afghanistan. But since it could not do that, it sought to bypass Pakistan by envisioning an alternative route: the International North South Transportation Corridor (INSTC), India decided to invest in Chabahar Port, which is situated just 72 km north of Gwadar. It aimed at reaching Central Asia, Russia and eventually Europe through Iran. But US sanctions on Iran and the Russia-Ukraine war have left the INSTC in tatters, largely due to Pakistan's overland connectivity veto and geopolitical disputes. Hence, to materialise this long-cherished dream, India has now foxed its eyes on the IMEEC to deny Pakistan any bargaining power. Reinforcing its ties with the oil- rich Middle Eastern countries is another motivation India bas significantly strengthened its trade and economic ties with the UAE, KSA and other countries in the region, and these are likely to further deepen if the IMEEC sees the light of day.
The normalisation of Arab-Israel ties and greater economic integration of the Middle East are also major underlying motivations for launching this initiative, and the IMEEC could also become the driver of achieving these objectives. As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, this economic corridor fits perfectly into its objective of remodelling its economy to make it less dependent on oil, as per Saudi Vision 2030 vigorously proposed by the Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman Similarly, for the UAE, which is projecting itself as the global hub for trade, tourism and finance, and is working hard to open up its vast resources to a global audience, the IMEEC provides a golden opportunity to achieve these lofty goals. Right after the Abraham Accords in 2020, which led to the normalisation of UAE-Israel ties, both states immediately began constructing a pan-Middle East rail link to connect the UAE to Haifa. Now the non-recognition of Israel by the Saudi kingdom is the only hurdle in this rail link, as only the 300-km-long leg of the Pan-Middle East Rail Link intended to pass through the desert of Saudi Arabia remains unconstructed. Now that the peace deal on the pattern of the Abraham Accords is right on the anvil, the United States and Israel are hoping that this missing link will also be completed after the signing of a peace treaty. It is, therefore, right to conclude that the normalisation of Arab-israel ties is both the cause and impact of the IMEFC, and unfortunately, it would also bury the two-state solution to the Palestine issue deep under the sand of the Arabian Desert.
Washington is eyeing the IMEEC to reverse the recent trend of declining US influence in the Middle East amidst the rapidly growing influence of China In the last five years, in particular, China's clour has grown significantly. Ever since the launch of BRI in 2013, several Gulf countries have embraced President Xi's signature initiative. which has allowed China to invest in strategically important locations such as the UAE's Abu Dhabi Port, Qatar's Hamad Fort and Kuwait's Silk City. Not only that, the Gulf states have also started participating in China's multilateral arrangements. For instance, President Xi received a red carpet welcome during his visit in December 2022, and six Gulf countries endorsed his multilateral projects, such as the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative. On top of that, China has also succeeded in brokering a historic reconciliation deal between the KSA and Iran that led to the resumption of diplomatic ties after seven years. In another major development that indicates its growing footprint in this region, China also invited the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt to become part of the BRICS. At a time when Beijing was rapidly strengthening its position in this part of the world, the US suffered many setbacks. First, when Israel, the closest US ally in the Middle East, allowed a Chinese company to Invest in Haifa seaport, which happens to be the same port viewed as a critical connectivity node in the Mediterranean Sea under the IMFEC project, the US Navy threatened to stop its visits to the area. Later, in response to China's investment and presence in Abu Dhabi, Washington stonewalled negotiations about selling F-35 fighter jets to the UAE Similarly, Biden's visit to KSA also did little to break the ice, and the US experienced a continued decline in its clout in this region. Against this backdrop, the IMEEC comes into the equation. This project is being viewed in US policy circles as an important tool to influence regional developments and reassert US clout there. The IMEEC would help Washington achieve these foreign policy goals in many ways. First, it will build on several diplomatic initiatives that the United States has already been pursuing in the last five years. For instance, it will further strengthen and broaden the scope of the Abraham Accords, encouraging more Arab countries to normalise their ties with Israel because, in many ways, IMEEC is the continuation of the Abraham Accords. Similarly, it can also strengthen the 12U2 multilateral arrangement that seeks economic cooperation among Israel, the UAE, and India. Secondly, the US has also learned that continuously denouncing BRI as "predatory economics" would do little to convince regional countries not to establish economic links with China. It will have to offer alternative infrastructure-building projects, and IMEEC serves the very same purpose. Hence, for Washington, IMEEC is less about the economics of tomorrow than the politics of today.
Secondly, this project, as it has earlier been underlined, could speed up normalisation deals between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Israeli Prime Minister indicated this while addressing the UNGA session in September 2023. Holding a map of the Middle East, he drew a red line from India to Greece and termed the IMEEC project "a corridor of peace and prosperity." adding that this project would lead to tearing down the barriers between Israel and its neighbouring countries. Furthermore, he claimed that "peace between Israel and Saudi Arabia will create a new Middle East." Prince Mohammed bin Salman endorsed this, saying that Saudi Arabia is getting closer every day to a landmark deal with Israel, which is the normalisation of diplomatic relations. Whether due to negotiations preceded and followed by the inauguration of IMEEC or due to some independent diplomatic initiative, it seems obvious that this landmark project would pave the way for securing the biggest ever dream of Israel: diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, the custodian of Islam's holiest mosques.
The utter disregard for the plight of Palestinians by its Arab neighbours and their deafening silence over continuous genocide, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes committed by Israeli Defence Forces and settlers has resulted in what is being dubbed the largest-ever attack on Israel since 1973. The sea-, land and air-borne, well-coordinated assault by Hamas resistance fighters left Israeli forces in a deep state of shock. The scale of the attack prompted the Israeli PM to declare a "state of war," and he instructed Israeli forces to retaliate. The Hamas chief, Ismail Haniyeh, cited threats to Jerusalem's Al-Aqsa Mosque, the continuation of the Israeli blockade of Gaza for 16 consecutive years, and Israeli normalisation with countries in the region as triggers to launch the "Al- Aqsa Storm" operation. Many analysts believe that Hamas is attempting to make Arab states realise that accepting Israeli security unconditionally would not bring peace to the region. Hence, frustration growing among Palestinians over the betrayal by their Arab neighbours and the inkling of multilateral infrastructure-building projects like IMEEC is another outcome that IMEEC and similar diplomatir initiatives would likely produce There is no denying that IMEEC is a significant development and has the potential to transform the commectivity landscape of Eurasia. The corridor is capable of imparting world trade, transit, and finance at an unprecedented level It could also impact regional political and security dynamics as well. India is set to consolidate its geoeconomic outreach to the Middle East because IMEEC would cut transportation costs. Some analysts believe that containers will reach from Mumbai to Dubai and onward to Haifa in 40% less time, thereby reducing both associated costs and making supply chains resilient. Notwithstanding the significant benefits that IMEEC is set to bestow upon participant countries, this project has triggered a debate about whether IMELC is being launched to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative. This question warrants a closer examination and comparison of both projects to draw the right conclusion. Since the launch of the BRI in 2013, this signature transnational infrastructure and connectivity project has expanded tremendously, involving more than 150 countries across Asia, Africa and Europe and more than 30 international organiza- tions. As per Wang Wenbin, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, more than 3000 cooperative projects under the BRI have delivered nearly $1 trillion in investment and generated strong growth in the partner countries. Now that Beijing is set to celebrate the 10th anniversary of BRI on October 17-18, it can rightly claim that this colossal and ambitious infrastructure project has somehow unshed in a new era of trade and economies in Asia and beyond. This ambitious project has also increased China's influence, and it has made intrusions into even those regions where the US has long held some sort of sphere of influence, such as the Middle East. Naturally, the BRI and attendant investment garnered strong opposition from the USA and partners, and they have made efforts to come up with alternative infrastructure projects: IMEEC is one of them. Though it is being touted as a counter to BRI, the former is much smaller in scale than the latter.
For instance, IMEEC is projected to Involve investment that is substantially lower in comparison with the BRL Furthermore, the BRI has extensive geographical outreach, encompassing more than 150 countries. The IMEEC. on the other hand, would have a much smaller geographical span, covering 20 countries at most, primarily in the Middle East and Europe. Both of these ambitious projects also differ when it comes to transportation modes. The BRI involves a diverse network of transportation, with 70% of its routes focused on land-based railway and road infrastructure. IMEEC is mostly sea-based transportation, indicating logistical problems that it is going to face. In terms of organisation and financing, there are some differences. The BRI is a centralised economic endeavour wherein one state, China, has exclusive financial responsibility and offers a centralised decision- making platform. IMEEC has yet to face any clear demarcation and delineation of financial responsibilities, which could lead to serious handicaps in the future. More importantly, the BRI is a multidimensional initiative involving a wide array of development projects, including infrastructure development energy projects, fibre optics, agriculture and industrial development. The IMEEC appears Imuted in scope, encompassing mainly shipping lanes and building missing road and railway infrastructure in some countries. The directionality of both projects also differs. The BRI is multi-directional and has global tentacles, maintaining two-way movements of goods and capital across Asia, Africa, Europe and even the Americas, whereas the IMEEC would be a unidirectional project connecting India to Europe through the Middle East. This comparison makes it clear that IMEEC is undoubtedly a significant initiative, but it has some structural and geographical limitations that would make it hardly a substitute for China-sponsored BRI. Furthermore, many Gulf countries share a close partnership with Beijing, which would make it even harder for the US and India to market IMEEC as an alternative option to Chinese investment. Therefore, it seems inappropriate to paint this project as influential as BRI so that it would be able to dent China's clout in the Middle East. At best, it would complement existing trade routes and further integrate the regions.
In conclusion, the IMEEC can be a transformative infrastructure project. It has bright prospects of success because it is a project of the Rich Men's Club involving the wealthiest GCC and G-7 countries, and it does not need much terrestrial infrastructure building. Having said that, the project faces some serious problems as well, including, but not limited to, resolving complex regulatory and customs disputes among participant countries, unclear financial responsibility and opposition from Turkiye. It is also working on an alternative route connecting the Gulf and Iraq to Europe through Turkiye. But more importantly, the IMEEC would find itself at the mercy of the volatile and combustible politics of the Middle East. The Hamas-Israel conflict is an illustrative example. The recent war has forced Saudis to put normalisation with Israel "on ice" (The Times of Israel. thereby causing a serious blow to IMEEC. Hence, unlike BRI, which is immune to regional or bilateral conflicts, IMFEC is vulnerable and may see significant delays or inefficiencies. Therefore, it is right to conclude that organizationally, geographically, politically and financially, IMEEC would not be able to pose any serious threat to BRI, and no participant country would find it suitable economically to switch to one project at the cost of another except on the direct instigation and arm-twisting of Washington, as Italy has done. However, it is indeed a significant project from the perspectives of connectivity, infrastructure and geopolitics. One can hope both China and the United States will overcome their mutual suspicions and join their ranks together to ensure the peaceful coexistence of countries and civilizations alike, rather than reviving a Cold War-like global competition and conflict.
Article by Rannra
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